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Retrocausal models of quantum mechanics addfurther weight to the conflict between causalityand the possible existence of free will. We an-
alyze a simple closed causal loop ensuing from the in-
teraction between two systems with opposing thermo-
dynamic time arrows, such that each system can fore-
cast future events for the other. The loop is avoided
by the fact that the choice to abort an event thus
forecasted leads to the destruction of the forecaster’s
past. Physical law therefore enables prophecy of fu-
ture events only as long as this prophecy is not re-
vealed to a free agent who can otherwise render it
false. This resolution is demonstrated on an earlier
finding derived from the two-state vector formalism,
where a weak measurement’s outcome anticipates a
future choice, yet this anticipation becomes appar-
ent only after the choice has been actually made. To
quantify this assertion, weak information is described
in terms of Fisher information. We conclude that an
already existing future does not exclude free will nor
invoke causal paradoxes. On the quantum level, par-
ticles can be thought of as weakly interacting accord-
ing to their past and future states, but causality re-
mains intact as long as the future is masked by quan-
tum indeterminism.
Quanta 2016; 5: 53–60.
1 Introduction
Time-symmetric formulations of quantum mechanics are
gaining growing interest. Using two boundary conditions
rather than the customary one, they offer novel twists
to several foundational issues. Such are the Wheeler–
Feynman electromagnetic absorber theory [1], Hoyle and
Narlikar’s theory of gravitation [2], and Cramer’s trans-
actional interpretation [3]. Among these, however, the
Aharonov–Bergmann–Lebowitz rule [4] and Aharonov’s
two-state vector formalism [5] are distinct, in that they
even predict some novel effects for a combination of for-
wards and backwards evolving wave functions. When per-
forming a complete post-selection of the quantum state,
otherwise counterfactual questions can be intriguingly an-
swered with regard to the state’s previous time evolution.
These advances, however, might seem to come with
a price that even for adherents is too heavy, namely, dis-
missing free will. While quantum indeterminism seemed
to offer some liberation from the chains imposed on our
choices by classical causality, time-symmetric quantum
mechanics somewhat undermines quantum indetermin-
ism, as it renders future boundary conditions the missing
source of possible causes. This might eventually reveal
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causality to be just as strict and closed as classical causal-
ity. If the future is, in some sense, already there to the
point of being causally equal to the past, free will (which
is defined in Section 2) might appear to be as illusory as it
has appeared within the classical framework. We aim to
show this is not necessarily the case. The two-state vector
formalism is no worse off than classical physics, or other
formulations of quantum mechanics as it pertains to the
incorporation of free will. In other words, free will is not
precluded even when discussing a quantum world having
both past and future boundary.
In this special issue of Quanta, dedicated to Richard
Feynman and discussing time-symmetry in quantum me-
chanics, we examine what might seem to be a problem in
these formulations, namely the notion of free will [6]. Dis-
cussion of this kind might at first be regarded as philosoph-
ical in character, but we hope to formulate the problem
rigorously enough to yield nontrivial physical insights.
2 The Problem
Following Russell and Deery [6], we propose defining
free will as follows. Let a physical system be capable of
initiating complex interactions with its environment, gain-
ing information about it and predicting its future states, as
well as their effects on the system itself. This grants the
system purposeful behavior, which nevertheless fully ac-
cords with classical causality. Now let there be more than
one course of action that the system can take in response
to a certain event, which in turn lead to different future
outcomes that the system can predict. Free will then de-
notes the system’s taking one out of various courses of
action, independently (at least to some extent) of past
restrictions. This definition is very close in spirit to the
one employed in [7], i.e. the ability to make choices. It
should be emphasized that even in our time-symmetric
context, free will means only freedom from the past, not
from the future (see also [5]).
In classical physics, conservation laws oblige any event
to be strictly determined by earlier causes. In our con-
text, this might apparently leave only one course of action
for the system in question, and hence no real choices.
When moving to the quantum realm, free will might be
recovered [7], but then again, if one adds a final boundary
condition to the description of the quantum system, can
free will exist? We shall answer both classical and quan-
tum questions on the affirmative, employing statistical
and quantum fluctuations, respectively.
In what follows, we analyze a classical causal para-
dox avoided by the past’s instability. We subsequently
consider a more acute variant of this paradox and dis-
cuss a few possible resolutions. Then we present the
quantum counterpart of these two paradoxes where inher-
ent indeterminism saves causality. We show that within
the two-state vector formalism, although both future and
past states of the system are known, genuine freedom is
not necessarily excluded. We then define and quantify
weak information that is the kind of information coming
from the future that can be encrypted in the past without
violating causality.
3 Interaction between Two Systems
with Opposing Time-Arrows
To demonstrate the possibility of knowing one’s future
and its consequences, we discuss a highly simplified clas-
sical gedanken experiment. Naturally, there are imme-
diate difficulties with such a setup. For example, can
two regions in space have opposite time arrows to begin
with? Can observers inside them communicate? These
and other questions deserve further probing, but we focus
here only on what would happen if several conditions are
met, rather than whether and how they can be achieved.
Consider, then, a universe comprised of only two
closed, non-interacting laboratories located at some dis-
tance from one another. Suppose further that their ther-
modynamic time arrows are opposite to one another, such
that each system’s future time direction is the other’s past.
Finally let each laboratory host a free agent, henceforth
Alice and Bob, capable of free choice.
It is challenging to create a communication channel
between two laboratories of this kind. An exchange of
signals is possible in the following form. A light beam is
sent from the exterior part of one laboratory to the other’s
boundary, where a static message is posted. The beam is
then reflected back to its origin. If the labs are massive
enough, the beam imparts only a negligible momentum
transfer.
The gedanken experiment proceeds as follows (Fig. 1):
t(b)1 : Bob sends a light-beam (red arrow) to Alice’s lab.
t(b)2 : He receives through his returning beam a message
from Alice saying: “Let me know if you see this message”
(dotted blue world-line).
t(b)3 : Bob posts a confirmation saying: “I saw your
message” (red world-line).
Then there are the following events in Alice’s lab:
t(a)1 : Alice sends a light-beam (blue arrow) to Bob’s
lab.
t(a)2 : Alice receives through her returning beam of par-
ticles that scattered off Bob’s message, i.e. she gets the
information from Bob through this beam reflected from
Bob’s system to her system.
t(a)3 : Alice, realizing that this confirmation comes from
her future, chooses not to post a message.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the two labs gedanken experiment
with two free agents, Alice and Bob.
The Causal Paradox is obvious: The dotted blue world-
line represents an absent message. How, then, could Bob
reply to a message which was removed before he was
supposed to see it?
We note that alongside with this formulation of the
paradox, one can equivalently describe the complemen-
tary scenario: Bob finds through his returning beam that
Alice did not post a message. Therefore, he sends no con-
firmation, but eventually Alice, having free will, decides
to post a message in contrast to Bob’s observation.
4 The Suggested Resolution
A key element in this causal paradox’s resolution is the
following well-known fact: Entropy-increasing processes
are highly stable, not sensitive to small changes in their
initial conditions or their evolution, whereas entropy-
decreasing processes are extremely vulnerable to any
interference.
Our question therefore is: Which time direction is
affected by Alice’s decision to change the future that
has been forecasted by Bob? The simplest and most
consistent answer is: Bob’s past. Upon Alice’s decision
to remove her message at t(a)3 , Bob’s prophecy, i.e. the
message of Bob to Alice regarding her future choice, turns
out to be false. This is clearly inconsistent with his earlier
observation of Alice’s message, which is understood now
to be highly unstable. His observation turns out to be a
large (hence very rare) statistical fluctuation.
We can now define the arrow of time of any system
as the thermodynamic direction which is stable against
changes. While a small change at the large system’s
present will negligibly affect its future, it can have dra-
matic effects into its past. Alice’s future was coupled in
our example to Bob’s past. By employing her free will,
she could completely alter his previous observations, but
the apparent paradox is resolved by taking into account
the chaotic nature of the entropy decreasing direction.
Indeed, the signals are weak enough, which makes them
amenable for this reinterpretation as fluctuations.
5 A More Acute Paradox
We shall now discuss an operationally simpler, yet con-
ceptually harder version of the paradox, which empha-
sizes the role of free will. Let the two labs with opposing
time arrows contain two simple machines rather than free
agents (see Fig. 2). One machine, A, posts 0 if it receives
0 as an input, and 1 if it receives 1. The second lab’s
machine, B, posts 1 if it receives 0 and 0 if it receives 1.
The paradox is as follows: In case A receives 0 from the
other lab, it posts 0. Then B receives the 0 as an input
and posts 1, in contrast to A’s earlier input. Alternatively,
A receives 1 from B, then posts 1. Then, B receives this
1 and posts 0, again in contrast to the A’s initial input.
It follows there are no valid initial conditions for this
combined system at a given time.
The resolution may be:
(1) Communication is impossible between two such
systems.
(2) The past of both systems is symmetrically unstable.
(3) There must be some stochastic element allowing
consistency.
(4) The operations of the two machines must be coor-
dinated.
As explained above, we assume that communication of
simple static messages is possible, hence we shall avoid
the first option (nevertheless, this paradox could actually
suggest that a special communication protocol is needed
between two such systems with opposite time arrows).
Options (2) and (3) complement each other and resonate
with the above notion of free will, as well as with the
quantum paradox to be presented below. Naturally, this
combination is favored by us. We believe this paradoxical
situation could have been avoided if a minor degree of
freedom (e.g. at the form of free will) were allowed. In
contrast, alternative (4) implies superdeterminism (see
for instance [8, 9]) or the so called conspiracy between
the two machines, which is philosophically disturbing (at
least in our view), negating free will altogether.
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Figure 2: An illustration of the two machines gedanken experiment. Machine A posts 0 (1) if it receives 0 (1), whereas machine
B posts 0 (1) if it receives 1 (0). The paradox is symmetric, but for simplicity it is shown to reside on the B side.
6 Going Quantum: The Two-State
Vector Formalism and Weak
Measurements
The possibility for resolving the above problem on classi-
cal grounds encourages seeking more interesting avenues
at the quantum level. Indeed a similar resolution will
be offered, namely the possibility of re-interpreting the
past. However, the basic concept on which the resolution
relies shifts from thermodynamic to quantum fluctuations
which are more suitable for describing small microscopic
systems. This is where time-symmetric quantum causality
comes in most naturally.
The two-state vector formalism is a time-symmetric
formulation of quantum mechanics employing in addition
to the forward evolving wave function (pre-selected state)
also a backwards evolving wave function (post-selected
state). This combination gives rise to the two-state-vector,
which provides a richer notion of quantum reality between
two projective measurements. This world-view has pro-
duced several predictions, so far well verified by weak
measurements [10–13] which delicately gather informa-
tion about the quantum state without collapsing it, and
thus do not change to post-selection probability.
In an earlier work [13] the following gedanken exper-
iment was proposed. A large ensemble of N spins is
prepared in Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen state. Each par-
ticle in every pair is weakly measured along the three
Bell orientations, before being strongly projected along
one of them. As was shown, each weak measurement
only slightly disturbs the state and hence the well-known
non-local correlations between the strong outcomes are
maintained in this experiment. It should be noted that in
return each weak measurement provides only a negligible
amount of information (to be quantified in Section 7).
However, since all the weak outcomes were classically
recorded, upon slicing them according to the projective
outcomes, one finds in retrospect, with extreme accuracy,
the weak values corresponding to all Bell orientations
(not only the ones eventually chosen for the projective
measurement). The question is then, how could the val-
ues reside in the weak data prior to the final Bell mea-
surements which demonstrated almost perfect non-local
correlations? Bell’s proof certainly forbids them to be
prepared in such a way so the two-state vector formalism
answer would be that they came from the future! The
important point in this retrocausal interpretation is the
weak values could be there, that is, could had causal ef-
fect on the pointer’s shift, without forcing a specific future
outcome.
The resolution is therefore simple: quantum indeter-
minacy guarantees that, should someone try to abort a
future event about which they have received a prophecy,
that prophecy would turn out to be a mere error.
Therefore, even in the two-state vector formalism
where present is determined by both past and future
events, the quantum indeterminism enables free will.
Naturally, more mundane explanations ought to be
considered before concluding that results of weak mea-
surement contain information regarding a future event.
By normal causality, it should be Alice’s measurements
which affected Bob’s, rather than vice versa. Perhaps, for
example, some subtle bias induced by her weak measure-
ments affected his later strong ones.
Such a past-to-future effect is considerably strained
by the following question: How robust is the alleged
bias introduced by the weak measurements? If it is ro-
bust enough to oblige the strong measurements, then it is
equivalent to full collapse, namely the very local hidden
variables already ruled out by Bell’s inequality. This is
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clearly not the case: weakly measured particles remain
nearly fully entangled. But then, even the weakest bias,
as long as it is expected to show up over a sufficiently
large N, is ruled out of the same grounds. The weak bias
alternative is ruled out also by the robust correlations
predicted between all same-spin measurements, whether
weak or strong.
Can Alice predict Bob’s outcomes on the basis of her
own data? To do that, she must feed all her rows of out-
comes into a computer that searches for a possible series
of spin-orientation choices plus measurement outcomes,
such that, when she slices her rows accordingly, she will
get the complex pattern of correlations described above.
The number of such possible sequences that she gets
from her computation is
(
N
N/2
)
∝ 2N√
N
. Each such se-
quence enables her to slice each of her rows into two N/2
halves and get the above correlations between her weak
measurements and the predicted strong measurements.
The distribution of the results is a Gaussian with λ
√
N/2
expectation and δ
√
N/2 standard deviation, so a δ shift in
one of the results, or even in
√
N of them, is very probable.
Hence, even if Alice computes all Bob’s possible future
choices, she still cannot tell which choice he will take,
because there are many similar subsets giving roughly
the same value. Also, as Aharonov et al. pointed out
in [13], when Alice finds a subset with a significant devi-
ation from the expected 50%-50% distribution, its origin
is much more likely, upon a real measurement by Bob, to
turn out to be a measurement error than a genuine physi-
cal value. Obviously, then, present data is insufficient to
predict the future choice.
7 The Strength of Information
Transmission
The information transmission between Alice and Bob
can be categorized into two different types with different
strength:
Strong information: This type describes the informa-
tion that, in general, has the potential to interfere with
Alice’s free choice. This is the classical kind of informa-
tion transmitted in the first gedanken experiment.
Weak information: In this case the information that Bob
sends to Alice will not, in any circumstance, interfere with
Alice’s free choice because it is buried much below the
quantum uncertainty level.
While the strong information transmission was dis-
cussed in Sections 3 and 4 and was shown to cast instabil-
ity into Bob’s past, it seems the weak information notion
should be further explained and quantified.
We now understand that weak information represents
information that does not actively interfere with the Al-
ice’s and Bob’s systems. Therefore, weak information
can be described employing weak measurement outcomes
since individually they only provide very partial informa-
tion that does not interfere with neither Alice’s nor Bob’s
system consistency. Similarly, strong information is re-
lated to projective measurement outcomes since they do
disturb the systems and provide definite results.
To create a clear distinction between the two kinds of
information, we shall discuss a simple thought experi-
ment. Suppose Alice has a spin she wants to measure. To
do that, she will use a Stern–Gerlach magnet with a non-
homogeneous magnetic field along some direction. Bob,
having an opposite time arrow, already knows that Alice
will choose the z-axis and will find an up outcome. If Bob
sends this strong information to Alice, she may choose the
y-axis instead and find a down outcome, reproducing the
paradoxical situation discussed above. However, if Bob
only tells her that she will find an up result along some
direction, no causal paradox will ensue (see also [14].
This is the kind of weak information which does not clash
with Alice’s free will nor with Bob’s history.
8 Fisher Information for Strong and
Weak measurements
Fisher information is a tool to quantify the hidden infor-
mation in a random variable Q regarding a parameter it
depends on. Using Fisher information we can now quanti-
tatively define the strong and weak information concepts
that were qualitatively introduced in Section 7.
Suppose that there is an unknown parameter θ which
we want to estimate (for example, θ can stand for the
relative phase between two superposed wave-packets).
We define a density function f of Q and another auxiliary
parameter ∆ which describes the type of information,
strong or weak. In probabilistic terms, it is called the
scale parameter of Q. In this case, Fisher information as
a function of ∆, I∆(θ), is given by
I∆(θ) := E
[ ∂∂θ ln f (∆Q; θ)
]2 ∣∣∣∣∣∣θ
 . (1)
It can be easily shown that I∆(θ) is in fact the product of
∆−1 and I(θ):
I∆(θ) =
∫ [
∂
∂θ
ln f (∆Q; θ)
]2
f (∆Q; θ) dQ
=
1
∆
∫ [
∂
∂θ
ln f (Q; θ)
]2
f (Q; θ) dQ
= ∆−1I(θ). (2)
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Now, in case of ∆→ 0, we find
lim
∆→0
I∆(θ) = lim
∆→0
∆−1I(θ) = ∞, (3)
hence we conclude that ∆→ 0 indicates strong informa-
tion.
The opposite case of ∆→ ∞ leads to
lim
∆→∞
I∆(θ) = lim
∆→∞
∆−1I(θ) = 0, (4)
which implies weak information, so for sufficient large
value of ∆, weak information is described by a negligible
Fisher information.
Let us now demonstrate this concept. Suppose that
θ is the relative phase between two superposed wave-
packets, which we want to measure in some interference
experiment. Let us assume that the interference pattern is
detected via some coupling 1/∆ to a measuring pointer.
If our estimation for the relative phase is described by a
Gaussian random variable Q, then the density function of
Q will be
f (Q; θ) =
1√
2piθ
exp
(
− 1
2θ2
Q2
)
. (5)
Depending on the coupling strength, the Fisher informa-
tion will be
I∆(θ) = ∆−1θ−2. (6)
9 Cryptography Can Protect
Causality
Weak or encrypted information can be used for communi-
cation between future and past in a causality preserving
manner thanks to quantum indeterminism. The main idea
behind this type of communication is quantum cryptogra-
phy [15]. Suppose Bob somehow knows what Alice will
choose in the future. He uses a quantum cryptography
scheme to encode Alice’s future choice and gives her the
encrypted prophecy. However, he does not share with
her the key to decode this revelation until she actually
makes her choice. In this case, similarly to the example in
Section 6, both Bob’s past and Alice’s future are secured.
Due to quantum indeterminism, Alice still has free will.
For example, in the BB84 scheme [16,17], even though
Alice and Bob communicate through a public channel,
their secret key is secured due to another form of quantum
indeterminism, namely, that non-orthogonal states are
indistinguishable. This means that even if the generated
string contains information regarding Eve’s future, it will
not create a causal paradox.
10 A Few Alternatives
In addition to the proposed resolution for the above para-
doxes, there exist some other well-known possibilities.
The parallel universe resolution suggests that if one goes
back in time and kills his grandfather he actually does it
in a parallel universe and therefore he does not interfere
with the laws of nature [18, 19]. A different approach
to solve this is by postulating another time dimension
in which such disagreements can be solved before being
recorded in our history [20, 21].
These two resolutions clearly lack simplicity and oblige
an excessive ontology to our existing theories. Moreover,
detailed work is needed to refute each and every paradox.
Therefore, bearing in mind Occam’s razor as a tool
for denying complex theories, it seems these alternative
solutions are unfavorable.
Another solution simply dictates that one cannot cre-
ate paradoxes in the universe and therefore cannot, for
instance, kill his grandfather. This approach implies a
universe guided by global consistency condition such
as in [22, 23] and was shown to naturally arise in post-
selected closed timelike curves [24].
11 Free will and Becoming
Classical physics treats time as a purely geometrical in-
gredient of the universe, alongside the three spatial dimen-
sions. Against the perfect logical rigor and experimental
support that make relativity so powerful, many physicists
find the block universe picture emerging from it mani-
festly awkward. In fact, the very notion of space-time
implies that, just as all locations have the same degree
of reality in space, so do all past, present, and future mo-
ments exist along the temporal dimension without any
moment being unique as the privileged now.
Against this mainstream view, there are alternative ac-
counts [25]. They suspect that, if we experience time
so differently from space, this difference may be objec-
tive. They provide some models to capture this notion of
dynamic time.
Bob’s access to Alice’s future in the classical gedanken
experiment above and the double boundary condition on
the wave function proposed by the two-state vector for-
malism may seem at first sight to resonate with a block
universe approach. However, as we have just seen, sta-
tistical and quantum fluctuations may provide us with
freedom to define the present. As was shown in Sections
4 and 5, this freedom, and also the notion of becoming, is
subjective and system-dependent.
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Within the two-state vector formalism, while both back-
ward and forward states evolve deterministically, they
have limited physical significance on their own — physi-
cal reality is created by the product of the causal chains
extending in both temporal directions. The past does not
determine the future, yet the future is set, and only to-
gether do they form the present. However, the existence
of a future boundary condition, and its deterministic ef-
fect, do not deny our freedom of choice. It is allowed due
to the inaccessibility of the data (which is a requirement
of causality, as discussed in Section 5). Examining the
concept of free will from a physical point of view, we
find that it must contain at least partial freedom from past
causal constraints, and such freedom is duly manifested
in the two-state vector formalism, where a juxtaposition
of freedom and determinacy is epitomized.
12 Conclusions
We examined the possibility of free will in a retrocausal
theory. Closed causal loops, which arise due to the inter-
action between two systems with opposing time arrows
were discussed. The suggested resolution of the ensuing
paradoxes relies on the thermodynamic instability of the
past.
Moving to the quantum realm, a similar paradox can
be solved via the quantum indeterminism, which is under-
stood to protect free will. This resonates with previous
findings of Georgiev [7]. Furthermore, we discussed the
strength of information transmission, where the terms
strong and weak are related to strong (projective) and
weak values, respectively. When information about a
future event is buried under quantum indeterminism it
cannot violate free will. Similarly, encrypted information,
such as the one available through weak measurements,
does not violate causality. The existence of free will in
these time symmetric models was conjectured to resonate
with a dynamical notion of time.
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